Abstract: There is doubt about whether the "democratic peace" proposition applies in Asia. I theoretically deconstruct regime type into institutional components including political competition, constraint on the executive, and mass participation, and ask whether taking these as distinct causal factors gives more empirical purchase on the relationship of domestic political institutions to states' external conflict behavior. I find that higher levels of political competition are associated with a lower likelihood of conflict initiation, but only when the potential target is relatively democratic. Thus my directed dyad analysis is consistent with a democratic peace effect in East Asia. It is also suggestive regarding the observed "East Asian peace" that has existed since 1979, because levels of political competition have risen considerably in the region, beginning in the late 1970s.
1 Does the logic of the democratic peace extend to East Asia? Can it help explain the relative peace in the region since 1979? The democratic peace proposition is most commonly understood as an expectation that democracies are very unlikely to go to war with each other.
While democratic peace theories are usually stated in universal terms, empirical tests in the Asian region have not been supportive, and authors examining the low levels of regional conflict in recent decades have not focused on increased degrees of democracy as an important factor. In this article I provide a theoretical discussion of the institutional foundations of democratic peace that distinguishes the potential effects of different aspects of political regimes. I argue that empirical tests of this more fine-grained set of institutional expectations should yield more robust evidence of democratic peace in the region.
Examination of institutional changes over time should also give insight into their relevance for the post-1979 relative East Asian peace. My focus is on institutions facilitating political competition, a relatively under-examined aspect of regime type in the context of interstate conflict.
A challenge for the democratic peace proposition is to demonstrate that it applies universally, across all regions of the globe (Goldsmith 2006; Henderson 2009 ). Previous studies have not found support for democratic peace in Asia (Goldsmith 2006 (Goldsmith , 2007 Johnston 2012; Kivimaki 2001; Tang 2012) . 2 In this article I present evidence for conflict initiation suggesting that focusing on political competition yields support that is robust among East Asian dyads, as well as globally, in a way that cannot be claimed for measures of other political institutions. I also ask whether a focus on political competition can help explain the relative peace experienced in the East Asian region after 1979 (Solingen 2007;  2 Some studies have argued that democratization does not cause interstate conflict in the region (Acharya 2010; Lind 2011 ), but have not presented systematic evidence of a pacifying effect. states with higher levels of political competition will be especially reluctant to initiate militarized conflicts with them.
In statistical tests I examine whether political competition reduces the likelihood of East Asian states' conflict initiation with more democratic regimes in the region. I show that political competition is indeed significantly related to a lower likelihood of conflict initiation against democratic regimes. I focus on the domestic institutions of potential conflict initiators in order to understand the institutional factors that condition leaders' foreign policy choices.
However, I assume that political elites and masses, although of course being affected by the particular configuration of institutions within their states, nevertheless perceive other states in more general terms, based on types of regimes rather than their specific internal mechanisms.
This leads me to focus on the overall regime type of the potential target states, because their overall degree of authoritarianism or democracy is more important for the potential initiating leaders' choices.
My argument hinges on the role of a viable opposition force in politics, which is the essence of genuine political competition. I argue that institutions of political competition drive leaders to think strategically about the political implications of foreign policy choices.
They try to anticipate, and forestall, potentially damaging criticism from the opposition.
Political competition compels leaders to seek policies that can be defended rhetorically against potential criticism aimed at weakening the sitting government, and to avoid policies that will lead to political vulnerability. States with institutions allowing high levels of political competition are, therefore, less likely to initiate disputes with democracies because it is harder to make a defensible moral or practical case for such disputes against the arguments of a viable opposition party or group. They may not be less likely to initiate conflict with non-democratic states, however, because these will be more readily justified in normative terms, and, other things equal, the chances of prevailing in conflict may appear higher as well.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section briefly discusses other institutional democratic peace theories in the existing literature. This is followed by an elaboration of my argument regarding the role of political competition in foreign conflict behavior. I then describe and present results of empirical tests for conflict initiation comparing the role of political competition with other aspects of regime type for global data (excluding East Asian dyads), and for East Asian dyads specifically, and I show how political competition might be an important part of the explanation for the lack of interstate war in East Asia since 1979. In the conclusion I discuss implications for understanding the connections between regime type and interstate conflict in East Asia and in general.
Political Systems and Militarized Interstate Conflict

Some Existing Institutional Approaches
While the democratic peace literature is vast, a fairly limited number of studies focuses on testing competing institutional explanations of why democracies might be very unlikely to fight each other. Some of these studies use aggregate regime-type measures to test specific institutional arguments by implication, or they examine only one institutional feature of regime type, without adequately controlling for other institutions which may be strongly correlated with it. 3 In this study I disaggregate regime type into three components and include each in my models, providing more robust controls for competing institutional expectations.
In this sub-section I discuss existing theories about institutions of participation and constraint on the executive. In the next sub-section I discuss institutions of political competition, and the underlying logic of my expectations and hypotheses.
3 See the discussion of these issues in a series of related papers: Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith (1999) ; Bueno de Mesquita, Koch and Siverson (2004) ; Clarke and Stone (2008); and Morrow, Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Smith (2008) .
peace focused strongly on leaders' accountability to a consent-giving public who, in choosing war, "would necessarily be resolving to bring upon themselves all the horrors of War" (Kant [1795 (Kant [ ] 1917 . Mass participation in leader selection is a key part of this argument. More recently, the differential costs of war for leaders and subjects has been a central aspect of widely known "structural" arguments of democratic peace (Russett and Oneal 2001, 53-58) .
Meaningful mass participation in selecting and removing national leaders also plays a constraining role on conflict initiation according to this approach (perhaps monadically, i.e., regardless of the regime type of the target state). As Russett and Oneal (2001, 273-74) write, "in a democracy, those who would bear the costs of war are the ones who decide whether it shall be fought…. The regular occurrence of elections is obviously important in this process.
It is the mechanism that forces government to consider the will of the people." 4 It is therefore important to consider political participation in my models. 4 Another prominent institutional theory of the connection between regime type and international conflict behavior is selectorate theory, first presented by Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith (1999) . Their focus is on the size of the "winning coalition" -the sub-set of the population necessary to place or maintain a leader in power. Wider winning coalitions provide leaders with incentives both to avoid costly wars and to reliably provide the public good of security. This is clearly related to the concept of political participation.
However, Bueno de Mesquita et al. are actually agnostic about whether states with wide winning coalitions will be less likely to initiate conflict with democracies (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2003, 243-45) . Specifically, they state that "war… between democracies is unlikely, though disputes are not." Democracies might initiate disputes with each other as frequently as they do with other states, but those between democracies will be less likely to escalate to full-scale war. Since I do not separately examine the escalation process in this rents from society, and the degree to which they are constrained from doing so. Leaders who are more constrained from extracting rents have less incentive for territorial expansion, and will also be less threatening to each other. As Lake (1992, 26-27) writes "[i]n practice, there are always positive costs of monitoring state behavior and exercising voice and exit. As a result, all states possess some ability to earn rents, although the ability will be larger in autocracies than in democracies…. To the extent that a state can earn rents, state and societal interests will diverge and the state will be biased toward an expansionary foreign policy."
This occurs for several reasons including "most important, the larger the state's rent-seeking ability, the higher the total revenue earned by the state. The more revenue (ceteris paribus), the larger the optimal size of the political unit." Lake (1992, 29-30) continues: "democracy, in this approach, constrains the ability of the state to extract monopoly rents at society's expense," with the result that "democracies are less likely to fight each other, for only in this area is the absence of an imperialist bias manifest." Schultz (1999; 2001 ) presents a theory involving constraints which has monadic implications for democracies' conflict behavior. Because of the greater transparency of democratic regimes, they will be more credible in interstate crisis bargaining. He ties this transparency to both political competition and constraints on leaders. I take both Lake's and Schultz's approaches to focus on institutions which constrain executive decision makers. This might include judicial review by the courts of the legality of executive decisions, a parliament with budgetary powers, or parliamentary oversight committees that scrutinize and investigate executive action. Thus it is important to account for constraints on executives in my models.
There may be a dyadic or monadic effect. When Participation is 17 or higher, the minimum for Competition is 5.3 and the minimum for that these indicators are in general correlated -I discuss checks for problems due to multicollinearity later in the article. In the next section I turn to an elaboration of my argument for the centrality of institutions of political competition.
Institutions of Political Competition
Competition is a core aspect of democracy, and has often been the focus of democratic theorists: "The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire power to decide by means of competitive struggle for the people's vote" (Schumpter 1950, 269) . Political competition, I suggest, should be related to more cautious decisions at the initiation stage of interstate conflict. This is so because competition implies a viable opposition, and the opposition is more likely to point out the mistakes of the decision makers in power, and, crucially, to call the attention of voters or other key power brokers, retrospectively, to apparently poor government decisions. Under effective institutions of political competition, foreign policy decision makers will fear policy failure because of the existence of a viable opposition advocating alternative policies (Achen and Bartels 2004; Colaresi 2004 ).
Accordingly, leaders in competitive political environments seek to make decisions which are defensible at the initiation stage of conflict, and after the fact, on both practical and moral legitimacy grounds, which are common and effective bases for criticizing foreign policy (Jentleson 1992; Gelpi, Reifler and Feaver 2007) . Leaders will face incentives to avoid criticism that their choices are not in the national interest, for example in terms of values, security, costs, and the chance of success. Political competition therefore makes leaders risk averse, which should help states avoid the costs of war, and conversely encourage them only Constraints is 5. When Constraints are 17 or higher, the minimum for Competition is 16 and the minimum for Participation is 12.5.
to be willing to initiate conflict when the chances of victory (and thus of the potential target's choice for capitulation rather than escalation) are relatively high, and when the issue at stake itself will gain and sustain wide support among the population (Jentleson 1992) .
Conversely, I also suggest that very low political competition will allow foreign policy decision makers to engage in conflict behaviors such as bluffing and probing, because the consequences of backing down from belligerent threats made during the initiation of a militarized dispute will be relatively mild. Without a critical opposition, such contradictory or risky behavior might simply be downplayed or unremarked by national leaders. News media, even if relatively free, tend to take cues from elite opinion leaders. With no strong opposition voices, there will be few competing opinion leaders to counter government frames (Chong and Druckman 2007; Entman 2009 ). Questions will not be asked in public debate about the wisdom of such behavior, for example regarding costs in damaged trade relations or international reputation. There will be minimal criticism of the moral justification for conflict. Facing a potential adversary of uncertain capability or will, foreign policy decision makers with little political competition at home will have material and informational incentives to "test the waters" with an initial belligerent act. The target state may concede some or all issues at stake, or it may respond with a convincing show of force itself. In either case, decision makers will have gained greater understanding of the potential target, while suffering little in terms of domestic interests. This means that states with little competition should be more likely to initiate interstate disputes, whether or not they are resolved to escalate them further to war.
Dyadic Expectations: Initiators and Targets
My expectations about higher and lower political competition should not apply to target states of all regime types in the same way, because regimes vary in their perceived legitimacy, in their expected military effectiveness, and in their ability to negotiate. Polities with high levels of political competition -seeking to forestall opposition criticism -will be less likely to target democracies when initiating disputes, because the moral case for militarized conflict would be harder to make, given that democracies are perceived as more legitimate in international norms of governance. Aspects of this claimed by theorists are that it is "very hard for democratic leaders to dehumanize people living in another democracy" in order to justify war, and that dictatorial analogies such as invoked by George H.W. Bush comparing Saddam Hussein to Hitler "would be unimaginable between the leaders of two democracies" (Russett and Oneal 2001, 65) . There is also considerable evidence that democracies are stronger adversaries during war in terms of the capabilities they can devote to the conflict (Goldsmith 2007; Lake 1992) and of their forces' ability to fight effectively on the battlefield (Reiter and Stam 2002) . Thus risk averse leaders in a politically competitive domestic environment will avoid them as targets, other things equal.
Leaders facing serious domestic political competition will also be reluctant to initiate a dispute if the opposition is likely to make a strong case that the use of force is unnecessary to reach an acceptable agreement with the target state. Since democracies are known to be more able to reach negotiated settlements in many instances ( There are, therefore, several reasons why regimes with higher levels of political competition will be less likely than regimes with low competition to initiate conflict against democracies, leading to dyadic expectations. These arguments lead to my first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The chance of a state initiating militarized interstate conflict will decrease as its level of political competition and the adversary's level of democracy increase.
I further expect that this effect is geographically universal, rather than limited to any region. As noted, East Asia is a region which has shown little evidence of a "democratic peace" effect. 
Measures of Political Institutions
My key independent variables are indicators of regime type and its institutional components. for the executive is either "popular or by an elected assembly" (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2010, 21-22) .
"Extent of government restriction on political competition" codes "extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena." This is assessed on a scale including "repressed," "suppressed," "factional," "transitional," or "competitive" systems. "Repressed" implies "[n]o significant oppositional activity is permitted outside the ranks of the regime and ruling party" while "competitive" implies "relatively stable and enduring, secular political groups which regularly compete for political influence at the national level" (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2010, 26-27) .
I create a Political Competition variable for State A which is an equally weighted combined measure of these, ranging from 0 to 20. I also created variables for participation and constraints, but I do not describe the indicators used in as much detail, because these are included in the models as controls, rather than being the theoretical focus of my analysis. In order to achieve equal weighting, attention must be given to the scale of each indicator. 
Measures of Interstate Conflict Initiation
I use four different indicators of interstate conflict initiation. For most of my analyses, I use the International Crisis Behavior (ICB; Wilkenfeld and Brecher 2009) dataset to code the initiation of a substantial international crisis by State A (using the "triggering entity" or TRIGENT variable) against State B ("target"). I believe this is the most appropriate indicator
of conflict initiation in the available datasets, because it most directly measures any serious security threat conveyed by one state towards another. It is based on whether a state "triggered a foreign policy crisis, i.e., initiated the act which was perceived by a state as creating a threat." In order to further assure that my results are relevant for initiations of a genuinely threatening nature, I also use an indicator that is restricted to crises coded by ICB as "clashes", which can include "minor clash," "serious clash," or "full-scale war", but exclude those crises that involved "no violence" although they did involve perceived threats.
As a further robustness test, I also use the Correlates of War (COW) Militarized
Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004) As an indicator of political rather than just security ties, I also include the number of "Joint IGO Memberships" -the number of international governmental organization in which both states share membership, as coded by the COW IGO project (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004) .
In order to correct for temporal dependence, I use a cubic polynomial for the years without conflict initiation by A against B in a dyad ("Peace Years," "Peace Years 2 ," and "Peace Years 3 "), as suggested by Carter and Signorino (2010) . These are calculated for each dependent variable.
Methods of analysis
The dependent variables are all dichotomous indicators of conflict, coded 1 for initiation of conflict by State A against State B, 0 otherwise (ongoing conflicts are dropped). A common and appropriate choice for such a limited dependent variable is probit regression. I use probit, with Huber-White standard errors corrected for clustering on the directed dyads. To strengthen causal inference, the model is identified with a one-year lag between the dependent and independent variables, so the initiation of conflict is measured in year t (e.g. , 1948-2006) , but all of the independent variables are measured in year t-1 (e.g. , 1947-2005) .
Interpreting the coefficients in limited dependent variable models is complicated by the fact that each depends on the particular values taken by other variables in the model. I now turn to the results for East Asian dyads. These are presented in Models 3-5, and in the marginal effect plots in Figure 1 . There is some evidence of a democratic peace effect when the interaction of A and B's Regime Type is considered in Model 3, contrary to some previous findings in the literature (perhaps due to the directed-dyad design focused on crisis initiation, rather than simply the occurrence of a conflict). However, the upper left panel in Figure 1 , showing the marginal effect derived from Model 3, reveals this to be relatively small. To test Hypothesis 2, regarding political competition in East Asia, the interaction term in Model 4 and the lower left panel in Figure 1 are relevant. As was the case in the global data, for East Asian dyads political competition appears to inhibit crisis initiation against target states that are relatively democratic. This is evident in the negative and significant coefficient in Model 4, as well as in the marginal effect plot, which shows a statistically significant, relatively large substantive effect.
[ Figure 1 about here] 7 I did produce such plots based on simulations for all analyses, and the results shown in Models 1 and 2 are supported in terms of sign and significance.
Examining the two other component interaction terms in Model 4, they may have a small positive relationship with conflict initiation, but this is only significant at the 90% level.
Any substantive impact appears to be small, judging by the right panels in Figure 1 .
The findings therefore seem clear. Both hypotheses find considerable support. My expectations regarding political competition and the initiation of crises against relatively democratic regimes are upheld in this initial and, I believe, most appropriate set of tests.
However, I now turn to a discussion of the robustness of these results in a range of other tests.
Robustness Tests
One concern that might be raised is that my findings are sensitive to model specification.
Model 5 in Table 1 addresses this by dropping all of the control variables, with the exception of those for geographic proximity and temporal dependence which I see as essential to properly modelling the outcome. While there are minor differences in the coefficients or significance for other aspects of regime type, the result for the interaction of CompetitionA and Regime TypeB is unchanged.
Another concern might be that the results depend on some unusual features of the dependent variable, the initiation of an international crisis. To address this, I use the alternative measures of conflict initiation by state A against state B. First, in Models 6-7 in Table 2 , I restrict crises to those categorized as "clashes" in the ICB data. These are more severe crises, and about 20% of the crises do not meet this threshold in East Asia over the period of study (9 of 43). Next, in Models 8-9, I use another conflict dataset that allows me to code initiators and targets, although not with as much confidence as the ICB data. The
Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset codes the first state in a dyad to show, threaten or use force in a way that appears to be directed at the target. Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer (2004, 138-139) suggest "caution against misinterpretations of identification of the 'initiator.'
The state or states on Side A on the first day of the dispute are simply the first states to take codeable military action. They should not be interpreted to be the states that 'started' the conflict, or that are responsible for the conflict." While it is reasonable to expect that the first state to use or threaten force directly is likely to be the initiator of the militarization of the dispute, this does not seem as good a measure as the ICB coding provides. I also use a more restrictive set of MIDs, those which incur at least one battle death, to ensure that what is being coded is serious conflict, not just an example of belligerent bluster.
[ Table 2 about here]
Across all of these alternative indicators of conflict initiation, of my three component interaction terms, only that for political competition produces any negatively signed coefficient in Models 6-9. Indeed all of its coefficients are negative, and all save that for all
MIDs are statistically significant (p = 0.18). I include models with and without the control variables for the ICB clashes (Models 6 and 7, respectively), as a further check.
In addition to the robustness tests presented in the tables, I conducted others which I describe, but for which I do not show results to save space. Although the issue of multicollinearity between the regime-component variables might be a concern, the results are Recently a "territorial peace" argument (Miller and Gibler 2011; Gibler 2012 ) has been advanced positing that democracies are unlikely to be involved in territorial disputes with each other, because settled borders make the development of a democratic system itself more likely. Thus there could be a degree of endogeneity to the observed democratic peace.
However, in East Asia this proposition might seem less plausible. Some jointly democratic dyads have outstanding territorial issues, and have experienced serious confrontations, including South Korea and Japan, Taiwan and Japan, and the Philippines and Malaysia (when 
Timing of the East Asian Peace
In this section I briefly present evidence that supports a role for political competition as a partial explanation for the observed East Asian peace after 1979. My study is focused only on the initiation of international crises, rather than the escalation of ongoing crises to war. This limits its implications for understanding the absence of war itself. 8 However, other things 8 Elsewhere I propose that trade volume in East Asia strongly inhibits conflict escalation to war, and shows a steep increase in the region after 1978 (MSauthor).
equal, if there are fewer crises initiated, then there should be fewer opportunities for escalation to full-scale war. In addition, looking to the future, the implication of my findings for East Asia if political competition continues to increase in the region is that this will further reduce the frequency of crises and help maintain the peace, especially if overall democracy levels also continue to increase.
Empirically it is the case that levels of political competition in East Asia began to increase around the late 1970s, as evident in Figure 2 , and this trend has continued, perhaps [ Figure 3 about here]
Although a discussion in any detail of the possible causes of the regional increases in political competition and democracy levels from the late 1970s onwards is beyond the scope of this article, one plausible explanation would seem to be the relaxation of regional tensions, and the de-ideologization of regional international relations, that occurred after the US-PRC rapprochement in the 1970s and the PRC's reforms under Deng Xiaoping begun in 1978. The relaxation of regional security tensions allowed regional governments greater security (Yahuda 2004, 174-183 I have also shown that the rise in regional levels of political competition corresponds well to the observed "East Asian peace", although at most my analysis provides a part of the explanation for that phenomenon because I do not assess the escalation stage, in which crises might escalate into wars. But political competition provides a copmpelling general explanation for reduced conflict initiation in the region from the 1980s onward. The implication of my analysis is that the deepening of political competition and democratic governance in East Asia will also help maintain, but of course not guarantee, this regional era of interstate peace. Notes: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05,  p <0.10; Conflict onset measured at year t, independent varaibles at t-1; Directed dyads; Probit models with standard errors corrected for clustering on directed dyads; Thailand-Cambodia
